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The Changing Demographic Profile of the United States 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The United States, the third most populous country globally, accounts for about 4.5% of the 
world’s population. The U.S. population—currently estimated at 308.7 million persons—has more than 
doubled since its 1950 level of 152.3 million. More than just being double in size, the population has 
become qualitatively different from what it was in 1950. As noted by the Population Reference Bureau, 
“The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more diverse.” The objective of this report is to highlight some of the 
demographic changes that have already occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends 
will reshape the nation in the decades to come (through 2050). 
The United States Is Getting Bigger. U.S. population growth is due to the trends over time in the interplay 
of increased births, decreased deaths, and increased net immigration. 
The United States Is Getting Older. Aside from the total size, one of the most important demographic 
characteristics of a population for public policy is its age and sex structure. This report illustrates how the 
United States has been in the midst of a profound demographic change: the rapid aging of its population, 
as reflected by an increasing proportion of persons aged 65 and older, and an increasing median age in 
the population. 
The United States Is Becoming More Racially and Ethnically Diverse, reflecting the major influence that 
immigration has had on both the size and the age structure of the U.S. population. This section considers 
the changing profile of the five major racial groups in the United States. In addition, trends in the changing 
ethnic composition of the Hispanic or Latino Origin population are discussed. 
Although this report will not specifically discuss policy options to address the changing demographic 
profile, it is important to recognize that the inexorable demographic momentum will have important 
implications for the economic and social forces that will shape future societal well-being. There is ample 
reason to believe that the United States will be able to cope with the current and projected demographic 
changes if policymakers accelerate efforts to address and adapt to the changing population profile as it 
relates to a number of essential domains, such as work, retirement, and pensions; private wealth and 
income security; the federal budget and intergenerational equity; health, healthcare, and health spending; 
and the health and well-being of the aging population. These topics, among others, are discussed briefly 
in the final section of this report. This report will be updated as needed. 
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Summary 
The United States, the third most populous country globally, accounts for about 4.5% of the 
world’s population. The U.S. population—currently estimated at 308.7 million persons—has 
more than doubled since its 1950 level of 152.3 million. More than just being double in size, the 
population has become qualitatively different from what it was in 1950. As noted by the 
Population Reference Bureau, “The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more diverse.” The 
objective of this report is to highlight some of the demographic changes that have already 
occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends will reshape the nation in the 
decades to come (through 2050). 
The United States Is Getting Bigger. U.S. population growth is due to the trends over time in the 
interplay of increased births, decreased deaths, and increased net immigration.  
The United States Is Getting Older. Aside from the total size, one of the most important 
demographic characteristics of a population for public policy is its age and sex structure. This 
report illustrates how the United States has been in the midst of a profound demographic change: 
the rapid aging of its population, as reflected by an increasing proportion of persons aged 65 and 
older, and an increasing median age in the population. 
The United States Is Becoming More Racially and Ethnically Diverse, reflecting the major 
influence that immigration has had on both the size and the age structure of the U.S. population. 
This section considers the changing profile of the five major racial groups in the United States. In 
addition, trends in the changing ethnic composition of the Hispanic or Latino Origin population 
are discussed. 
Although this report will not specifically discuss policy options to address the changing 
demographic profile, it is important to recognize that the inexorable demographic momentum will 
have important implications for the economic and social forces that will shape future societal 
well-being. There is ample reason to believe that the United States will be able to cope with the 
current and projected demographic changes if policymakers accelerate efforts to address and 
adapt to the changing population profile as it relates to a number of essential domains, such as 
work, retirement, and pensions; private wealth and income security; the federal budget and inter-
generational equity; health, healthcare, and health spending; and the health and well-being of the 
aging population. These topics, among others, are discussed briefly in the final section of this 
report. This report will be updated as needed. 
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he United States, the third-largest population globally, accounts for about 4.5% of the 
world’s population. The U.S. population—estimated in the 2010 Census at 308.7 million 
persons1—has more than doubled from its 1950 level of 152.3 million.2 More than just 
being double in size, the U.S. population has become qualitatively different from what it was in 
1950. As noted by the Population Reference Bureau, “The U.S. is getting bigger, older, and more 
diverse.”3 The objective of this report is to highlight some of the demographic changes that have 
already occurred since 1950 and to illustrate how these and future trends will reshape the nation 
in the decades to come.4 
While this report will not discuss policy options, it is important to recognize that the inexorable 
demographic momentum will produce an increasingly older population in the United States. 
There is ample reason to believe that the United States will be able to cope with the current and 
projected changes if policymakers address and adapt to the changing demographic profile as it 
relates to a number of essential domains such as work, retirement, and pensions, private wealth 
and income security, transfer systems, and the health and well-being of the aging population.5 
These topics are discussed briefly in the final section of this report. 
Population Size and Growth—The United States Is Getting Bigger 
The U.S. population has experienced remarkable growth since 1950. From a base of about 152 
million Americans in 1950, an additional 156 million persons were added to the population 
between 1950 and 2009, with the number of additional women slightly outnumbering additional 
men (see Figure 1). This increase (of about 103%) in the size of the U.S. population was 
remarkable compared with other industrialized countries. Germany and Italy, for instance, grew 
by only 21% and 30% respectively during the same period.6 And, a number of countries, most 
notably in Eastern Europe, have recently experienced absolute reductions in the size of their 
populations.7 
                                                             
1
 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Resident Population at http://www.census.gov/.  
2
 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php, September 
22, 2009. 
3
 P. Scommegna, U.S. growing bigger, older, and more diverse. Population Reference Bureau, April 2004, at 
http://www.prb.org/. 
4
 Through year 2050 is considered in this report. 
5
 National Research Council, 2001, Preparing for an Aging World: The Case for Cross-National Research, Panel on a 
Research Agenda and New Data for an Aging World, Committee on Population and Committee on National Statistics, 
Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Washington, DC: National Academy Press (hereinafter 
cited as National Research Council, Preparing for an Aging World). 
6
 CRS calculations based on data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision, Highlights, 
United Nations: New York, 2009, available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/
wpp2008_highlights.pdf. These data have not been updated since 2008; therefore, it is not possible to make 
comparisons through 2010. 
7
 Population Reference Bureau, 2010, World Population Highlights: Key Findings from PRB’s 2010 World Population 
Data Sheet available at http://www.prb.org/pdf10/10wpds_eng.pdf. 
T 
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Figure 1. U.S. Population, by Sex, 1950-2050, in Millions 
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Sources: CRS calculations based on (1) for 1950-2000 estimates, F. Hobbs & N. Stoops, Demographic Trends in 
the 20th Century, Census Bureau: CENSR-4, issued November 2002, and (2) for 2010-2050, U.S. Census Bureau 
Table 2. Projections of the Population by Selected Age Groups and Sex for the United States: 2010 to 2050 
(NP2008-T2),issued August 2008 at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/files/nation/summary/
np2008-t2.xls.  
Despite the growth of the U.S. population over this period, the United States’ share of the world’s 
population has been declining as less developed, higher fertility countries have grown more 
rapidly. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria, for instance, now rank #6, #7 and #8 in total 
population size, surpassing more developed countries—such as Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy—that are no longer among the world’s 10 most populous countries.8 
The Census Bureau projects that the U.S. population will continue to grow, to almost 440 million 
persons by year 2050,9 albeit at a slower pace than the growth recorded over the past half-century. 
Note, however, that population projections, which rely upon assumptions about the future courses 
of mortality, fertility, and immigration are uncertain. More pessimistic growth projections are 
offered by the United Nations and the Social Security Administration, which estimate that the 
U.S. population will be 404 million or 411 million respectively in the same year.10 
                                                             
8
 U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/ranks.php. 
9
 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 2. Projections of the Population by Selected Age Groups and Sex for the United States: 
2010 to 2050 (NP2008-T2), issued August 2008, at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/files/nation/
summary/np2008-t2.xls.  
10
 It is beyond the scope of this report to reconcile these differences. All projections are medium-variant, or what the 
agencies consider to be the most likely scenario. See (1) United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 
Revision; and (2) The 2010 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor’s Insurance 
and Disability Insurance Funds. Washington DC: August 9, 2010, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2010/trTOC.html. 
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Figure 2. Population Growth, Birth, Death, and Net Immigration Rates: 
United States, 1950-2050 
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Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) compilation based on historical and projected figures from the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). See the Appendix for more 
information on sources and data used to derive this figure.  
Notes: (1) Crude birth rate (CBR): the number of live births per 1,000 total population. Estimates for 1950-58 
were adjusted by NCHS to correct for under-registration of births. (2) Crude death rate (CDR): the number of 
deaths per 1,000 total population. (3) Net immigration rate: number of immigrants less number of emigrants per 
1,000 total population.  
Average annual growth rates11 for each 10-year intercensal period between 1950 and 2000 were 
positive, but have generally been declining over time (see Figure 2). Expressed as a percentage of 
the population at the beginning of the period, the average population growth rate in the 1950s, for 
example, was 1.7% per annum while it was only 0.9% per year during the 1980s. The Census 
Bureau assumes that the growth rate will remain positive through year 2050, but will fluctuate 
over the time period. The current level of 0.8% per annum will increase through 2030 to closer to 
0.9% per annum. After 2030 the growth rate is expected to return to 0.8% per annum.  
Trends in the size and growth of the U.S. population reflect the interactions of three underlying 
determinants: 
• The role of human reproduction and the fertility behavior of American couples; 
• Trends in disease risk and subsequent mortality, and, 
• The net effect of international immigration to and from the United States. 
                                                             
11
 Population growth rate: the number of persons added to (or subtracted from) a population in a year due to natural 
increase (births minus deaths) and net immigration per 1,000 persons in the population. Alternatively, the measure can 
be expressed as the percentage change of the population at the beginning of the time period subtracted from the 
population at the end of the time period and then divided by the population at the end of the time period.  
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Figure 2 and the Appendix (at end of this report), in addition to highlighting the estimated and 
projected trends in population growth for the period 1950-2050, also highlight trends and 
projections for these three underlying components of population change. Characteristics of U.S. 
fertility, mortality, and immigration are discussed in the following sections. 
Fertility12 
Average fertility in the United States reached a post-World War II maximum during the peak of 
the “baby boom” in the late 1950s. The highest observed number of annual births (4.3 million) 
and birth rates (25.3 births per 1,000 population) since 1950 were recorded in 1957. Steep 
declines were observed in the 1960s and early 1970s, a broad trend that was also observed in 
Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. U.S. birth rates since the early 1970s have 
remained remarkably constant,13 mostly fluctuating in the mid-teens, and reached an all-time low 
of 13.9 live births per 1,000 population in 2002. In 2008, the most recent year for which final data 
are available, there were 14.0 live births per 1,000 in the population and almost 4.25 million 
births were recorded. This represents a small decline from 2007 when the largest number of births 
were recorded in nearly 4 decades, though the birth rate remains lower than levels seen during the 
baby boom.14  
Characteristics of American Fertility 
Highlights of American fertility behavior in 2008 include the following:15 
• There were approximately 4.25 million live births, a 2% decrease from the 2007 
record high. 
• The crude birth rate (CBR) was 14.0 live births per 1,000 total population, which 
represents a slight decrease since 2007, but is an increase from 2002, the year in 
which the lowest U.S. CBR was recorded.  
• The general fertility rate (GFR), which relates births to the number of women in 
their childbearing ages, was 68.6 live births per 1,000 women aged 15-44 years, a 
1% decline from 2007.  
• Fertility rates, as measured by the GFR, declined for women below the ages of 
40, but increased to the highest levels recorded in more than 40 years for women 
ages 40 to 44. 
                                                             
12
 The Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is the primary measure of fertility used in this section because of its value in indicating 
directly the contribution of fertility to the population growth rate. However, because the age and sex composition of a 
population has a strong influence on the level of the CBR, additional measures to understand the underlying fertility 
trends are also used. 
13
 Gregory Spencer, Preface, The Direction of Fertility in the United States. Conference proceedings for a conference 
hosted by the Council of Professional Associations on Federal Statistics, Alexandria, VA, October 2-3, 2001. 
14
 National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSR), Births: Final Data for 2008, DHHS/CDC/ NCHS, vol. 59, no. 1, December 
2010 (hereinafter cited as NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2008).  
15
 NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2008. For information about changes from 2002, see discussion in National Vital 
Statistics Reports (NVSR), Births: Final Data for 2006, DHHS/CDC/ NCHS, vol. 57, no. 7, January 7, 2009 
(hereinafter cited as NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2006). 
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• Fertility is slightly below “replacement level” in 2008 at 2.08. This rate is in 
contrast with the fertility rates recorded in 2006 and 2007, which were above 
replacement level for the first time since 1971.16 Although the U.S. fertility rate 
in 2008 was below replacement level, it remains higher than the rates observed in 
other developed countries. Specifically, the 10 countries with the lowest recorded 
fertility rates (Macao SAR, Hong Kong, Bosnia Herzegovina, Republic of Korea, 
Malta, Japan, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, and Belarus) have reached 
historically unprecedented fertility rates with rates below 1.3 children per 
woman.17  
• Teenage childbearing declined by 2% in 2008,18 this is in contrast to increased 
rates found in 2006 and 2007. These increases followed a 14-year decline.19  
• Childbearing by unmarried women reached record levels in 2008. More than 
1.7 million babies or 40.6% of all births were to unmarried women. Beginning in 
1980, nonmarital births have become an important factor driving increasing 
fertility rates. However, since 1980, the age distribution of nonmarital births has 
changed—shifting away from teenager mothers. Recent increases in non-marital 
births have been driven by increased rates of non-marital births among women 
over the age of 30. There also continues to be wide variation in nonmarital birth 
rates by race and Hispanic origin, with the highest rates for black and Hispanic 
women.  
• The mean age of all first-time mothers in the United States was 25.1 years, which 
is slightly higher than the rates observed in 2006 and 2007. This increase is 
driven by a decline in births to women under the age of 25. The mean age of first 
time mothers, reflects a continuing tendency for women to postpone childbearing 
and increased birth rates for women over the age of 35. Mean age at first birth 
varies considerably by race and Hispanic origin. Women of Asian and Pacific 
Islander descent had the highest age at first birth (28.7 years), whereas American 
Indian women had the lowest (21.9 years). 
• U.S. fertility rates declined in 2008 for women below the age of 40, a change 
from prior years where rates had been increasing steadily (Table 1). 
                                                             
16
 The replacement level of fertility measures the level of fertility and mortality in a population at which women will 
replace themselves in a generation. It corresponds to a total fertility rate, or completed family size, of about 2.10 births 
per woman. 
17
 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. 
18
 Data from 2009 indicate that the teen birth rate fell to the lowest levels ever recorded. See Stephanie J. Ventura and 
Brady E. Hamilton, U.S. Teen Birth Rate Resumes Decline, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, NCHS Data Brief No. 58, Hyattsville, MD, 
February 2011.  
19
 NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2006 and NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2008. 
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Table 1. Trend in Birth Rates Between 2007 and 2008, by Age of Mother 
Age of 
Mother 
Rate per 1,000  
Women in Age 
Category in 2008 
Trend Between 2007 and 2008 
10-14 years 0.6 Unchanged, but had declined in prior years  
15-17 years 21.7 
Declined by 2%, a change from the increase observed between 2005 and 2007. 
The rise from 2005 to 2007 interrupted a 45% decline in the teenage birth 
rate from 1991 to 2005.  
18-19 years 70.6 
Dropped 4%. The rate had declined by 26% since 1991, but then rose 6% from 
2005 to 2007.  
20-24 years 103.0 
Declined by 3%. The birth rate for this group had generally been declining 
since 1990.  
25-29 years 115.1 Declined by 2%. Rates for this age group have fluctuated since 1991.  
30-34 years 99.3 Declined by 1%.  
35-39 years 46.9 Declined by 1%. This the first decline for this age group in 3 decades.  
40-44 years 9.8 
Increased. Highest rate recorded since 1967; the birth rate for this age group 
increased by 32% since 1999.  
45-49 years 0.7 Increased by 4%.  
Source: NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2008, vol. 59, no. 1, December 2010.  
Beyond the current year estimates presented above, the Census Bureau uses demographic 
projection techniques to predict future trends in American fertility. They project that the total 
fertility rate will remain at or above replacement level (2.1 births per woman age 15-44) through 
2050. This is in contrast to much of Europe and to Canada, where fertility rates are below 
replacement level and not expected to increase.20 Experts suggest that these falling fertility rates 
are a result of societal changes, such as the increasing costs of raising a child, rising levels of 
women’s labor force participation, and delayed childbearing.21 While the U.S. has experienced 
these same societal changes, U.S. fertility remains higher because of societal adaptations such as 
increased access to child care and increased male involvement in household labor and 
childrearing. Additionally, differences in U.S. fertility rates may be in part driven by differential 
fertility rates by racial and ethnic groups. For example, the average fertility rates for women of 
Hispanic origin was approximately 2.9 in 2008, while the fertility rate for non-Hispanic whites 
was 2.0 or slightly below replacement level.22 Despite these projections, future trends in fertility 
are notoriously difficult to predict and specialists continually question the underlying assumptions 
of the models. 
                                                             
20
 S. P. Morgan and M.G. Taylor, 2006, Low Fertility at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century. Annual Review of 
Sociology vol. 32, 2006, pp. 375-399. 
21
 Ibid. See also: R.R. Rindfuss, “The Young Adult Years: Diversity, Structural Change, and Fertility,” Demography, 
vol. 28, pp. 493-512, 1991. S.M. Bianchi, “Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or 
Surprising Continuity?” Demography, vol. 37, pp. 401-14, 2000. 
22
 NVSR, Births: Final Data for 2008. This is the average for all women of Hispanic origin. Fertility rates differ among 
Hispanic groups, with women of Cuban origin on average having lower fertility rates than those of Mexican origin. In 
addition, fertility rates vary by generation in the U.S. with immigrant women having higher fertility rates than native 
born women. 
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Mortality 
As is evident from Figure 2 and Figure 3, crude death rates (CDR) in the United States have 
been remarkably constant since 1950, fluctuating within the range of 8.1 to 9.7 deaths per 1,000 
persons.23 The record low of 8.0 was attained in 2007, the most recent year for which final data 
are available.24 
In general, crude death rates are referred to as crude because they are influenced by two 
underlying characteristics of a population, making it difficult to interpret trends in the CDR 
without disentangling trends in these two underlying components: 
• The population’s age structure. An older population generally has higher crude 
death rates because a higher proportion of persons are in the older age groups 
where death rates are higher. 
• Mortality risk, or the likelihood of death at a particular age. The risk of mortality 
reflects the health and disease profile of the underlying population, public health 
and sanitation, the availability of and access to health care, the education of the 
population, and other factors. 
Age-adjusted death rates are better indicators (than crude rates) to measure mortality risk across 
time or across populations.25 If age-adjusted rates are considered for the United States over time,26 
a striking pattern of the mortality risk emerges (see Figure 3): age-adjusted death rates have 
exhibited a dramatic decline since 1950 (rather than being remarkably constant, as suggested by 
the crude death rates). Use of the age-adjusted rates has allowed a much more refined evaluation 
of trends in American mortality over time. Specifically, they show that, despite the fact that the 
U.S. population has been aging over the past half-century, the risk of mortality has actually been 
falling. 
                                                             
23
 The crude death rate (CDR) is the primary measure of mortality used in this section to show the contribution of 
mortality to the population growth rate. 
24
 See National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSR), Deaths: Final Data for 2007, DHHS/CDC/NCHS, vol. 58, no. 19, May 
20, 2010, hereinafter cited as NVSR, Deaths: Final Data for 2007). Note that preliminary data on deaths in 2008 
suggests that the CDR has increased to 8.1. See NVSR, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2008, DHHS/CDC/NCHS, vol. 
59, no. 2, December 9, 2010.  
25
 Note that age-adjusted rates have little meaning in themselves; they are constructs that show what the level of 
mortality would be if no changes occurred in the age composition of the population from year to year. 
26
 The age-adjusted rates are based on the year 2000 standard population. By definition, crude and age-adjusted death 
rates converge in this year. 
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Figure 3. Crude and Age-adjusted Death Rates: United States, 1950-2007 
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Source: CRS computations using data from the vital statistics system, NCHS. 
Notes: CDRs are on an annual basis per 1,000 population; age-adjusted rates per 1,000 U.S. standard population 
(year 2000). 
Characteristics of American Mortality 
Highlights of trends in American mortality in 2007 include the following:27 
• More than 2.4 million resident deaths were registered in the United States in 
2007.  
• The crude death rate was about 7.6 deaths per 1,000 total population, a record 
low.  
• Life expectancy at birth28 was 77.9 years, this continues a long-term trend of 
increasing life expectancy. Record high life expectancy was attained by the total 
population, as well as by both the black and white populations. Both males and 
females in both of the two major race groups attained record high levels. U.S. life 
expectancy continues to fall short of that attained by a number of other countries, 
                                                             
27
 NVSR, Deaths: Final Data for 2007. 
28
 Life expectancy at birth represents the average number of years that a group of infants would live if they were to 
experience the current observed age-specific death rates throughout their lives. See CRS Report RL32792, Life 
Expectancy in the United States, by Laura B. Shrestha.  
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including Japan (82.7 years), Hong Kong (82.2), Iceland and Switzerland 
(81.8).29 
• The 10 leading causes of death were (1) heart disease, (2) malignant neoplasms 
(cancer), (3) cerebrovascular diseases (stroke), (4) chronic lower respiratory 
diseases, (5) accidents (unintentional injuries), (6) Alzheimer’s disease, (7) 
diabetes mellitus (8) influenza and pneumonia, (9) nephritis (kidney disease), and 
(10) septicemia. Age-adjusted death rates continued to decrease for the three 
leading causes. The top 10 causes of death did not change between 2006 and 
2007; however, the Alzheimer’s disease and diabetes mellitus changed ranks. 
• The infant mortality rate was 6.75 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, a slight 
increase from the 2006 rate. U.S. infant mortality rates are higher than many 
other developed countries. In 2005, the last year for which comparable 
international data was available, the U.S. ranked 30th compared to a number of 
developed countries, behind developed countries such as Japan, England, and 
Canada.30  
• Differences in mortality between men and women increased slightly from 2006 
to 2007. In 2007, the age-adjusted death rate for men was 40.8% greater than it 
was for women. Life expectancy at birth for females was 80.4 years, while it was 
75.4 years for men (both increased from the previous year). The sex gap in life 
expectancy is 5.0 years, a very slight decrease from 2006. This gap has narrowed 
since its late 1970s peak of 7.8 years. 
• Differences in mortality between the black and white populations persist. The 
age-adjusted death rate for the black population was 1.3 times greater than for the 
white population. This means that the risk of dying is 30% higher for the black 
population than for the white population This ratio has remained constant since 
1997. In 2006, the infant mortality rate was 2.3 times greater, and maternal 
mortality rate was 2.7 times greater for the black population than for the white 
population. Average life expectancy is also 4.8 years higher for the white 
population than for the black population.  
• There are also differences between the white and Hispanic populations with the 
Hispanic populations experiencing lower age-specific death rates than the white 
population. However, this may be due to underreporting of Hispanic origin on 
death certificates. The Asian Pacific Islander population and the American Indian 
and Alaska Native population both have age-adjusted death rates that are lower 
than the white population, 40% and 20% lower rates respectively. However, the 
low death rates of the American Indian and Alaska Native population is likely 
attributed to the underreporting of deaths.  
As with the data for fertility, demographers use demographic projection techniques to predict the 
future trends in American mortality. The Census Bureau projects that (crude) death rates will 
                                                             
29
 CRS compilation from data in United Nations, World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision. Note that in 2008 
version of the U.N. lists the U.S. life expectancy for 2005 to 2010 as 79.2. See also, Eileen M. Crimmins, Samuel H. 
Preston, and Barney Cohen (Eds), International Differences in Mortality and Older Ages: Dimensions and Sources 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2011). 
30
 CRS Report R41378, The U.S. Infant Mortality Rate: International Comparisons, Underlying Factors, and Federal 
Programs, by Elayne J. Heisler. 
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remain low through 2050 in the narrow range of 8.6 to 9.7 deaths per 1,000 persons in the 
population. The rate will gradually increase, reflecting the Census Bureau’s assumption that the 
aging of the population will not be fully offset by continued reductions in the risk of dying. As 
with other demographic variables; however, future mortality and survival are difficult to predict 
and specialists disagree on not only the level but also the direction of future trends. Research 
suggests that current models may be too pessimistic in their assumptions about mortality and 
survival probabilities, i.e., Americans may live longer than currently projected.31 While some 
assert that life expectancy is approaching its natural limit, there has been a steady increase in life 
expectancy observed with an increase of three months per year for every year between 1840 and 
2000.32 Projections of future life expectancy vary. For example, one optimistic assumption 
predicts that international life expectancy will increase to 91.6 years for women by 2050.33 Others 
argue that this projection is too optimistic because it does not take into account that declines in 
mortality in early life (which increase life expectancy the most) are slowing. Additionally, 
smoking and obesity-related mortality is slowing life expectancy gains.34 However, there have 
been gains in life expectancy at the oldest ages and evidence that social and medical interventions 
are still effective at extending life thereby demonstrating that life expectancy may still be 
increasing and mortality rates may still be declining.35 
Net Immigration 
Immigration has been an important component of population growth in the United States. The net 
immigration rate (Figure 2) has been and is projected to be positive (with in-migration exceeding 
out-migration) for the full century (1950 to 2050). It fluctuated in the low range of 1.5 to 2.4 net 
migrants per 1,000 resident population between 1950 and 1979. An increasing trend has been 
noted since 1980, and the annual rates in the 1990s were generally in the range of 3.0 to 3.9. The 
U.S. Census Bureau projects that net migration will continue to be an important component of 
population growth in the United States through 2050 with net immigration continuing at higher 
rates than currently observed.  
Both gross immigration and gross emigration are important to consider when examining how 
immigration effects population growth and change. In general, the balance of gross immigration 
(of persons moving permanently to the United States) has exceeded gross emigration (of persons 
leaving) over the past century. A notable exception was observed during the Great Depression, 
when the number of out-migrants exceeded new immigrants (see Table 2). Reflecting fluctuations 
in economic conditions (in the United States and abroad) and U.S. immigration policies, the 
volume of immigrants36 flow to the United States has fluctuated over time. Starting in 1915, 
                                                             
31
 R. Lee, Report for the Roundtable Discussion of the Mortality Assumption for the Social Security Trustees, note 
dated September 11, 2002. 
32
 National Institute on Aging and U.S. Department of State, Why Population Aging Matters: A Global Perspective. 
March 5, 2007 at http://www.nia.nih.gov/ResearchInformation/ExtramuralPrograms/BehavioralAndSocialResearch/
GlobalAging.htm. This rate is for female life expectancy which is higher than male life expectancy; however, male life 
expectancy demonstrates similar patterns as female life expectancy.  
33
 J. Oeppen and J. Vaupel, Broken limits to life expectancy, Science, vol. 296, May 10, 2002, pp. 1029-1030.  
34
 Bongaart, J. How Long Will We Live? Population and Development Review, Vol. 32, Dec. 2006, p.p. 605-628. F. 
Pampel, Cigarette Use and the Narrowing Sex Differential in Mortality. Population and Development Review, vol. 28, 
no.1, March 2002, pp. 77-104 and Eileen M. Crimmins, Samuel H. Preston, and Barney Cohen (Eds), International 
Differences in Mortality and Older Ages: Dimensions and Sources (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2011). 
35
 Ibid.  
36
 These figures refer to legal immigrants, or citizens of other countries who have been granted visas that allow them to 
(continued...) 
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immigration to the United States was curtailed because of World War I, the introduction of 
numerical limits (or “quotas”), the economic depression of the 1930s, and World War II.37 
Starting in the 1950s, the volume of immigration flows to the United States has been steadily 
increasing. The average annual inflow was about 252,000 in the 1950s, about 332,000 in the 
1960s, 449,000 in the 1970s, and jumped to 734,000 in the 1980s. More than 9 million foreigners 
were admitted as legal immigrants to the United States between 1991 and 2000, an average of 
almost 910,000 a year. The number of legal immigrants in the last decade has fluctuated, 
surpassing 1 million in 2001 and 2002, falling below 1 million annually for 2003 and 2004 and 
rising above 1.1 million for 2005 through 2009.38 
There are few timely and reliable estimates of emigration of persons who leave the United States 
to permanently take up residence elsewhere (whether native-born or foreign-born Americans). 
Partly because of inherent methodological difficulties, the collection of emigration statistics was 
discontinued in 1957 and no direct measure has been available since then.39,40 Using indirect 
demographic techniques, the Census Bureau estimated that the number of emigrants leaving the 
United States has been increasing over the past decades—reaching about 234,000 persons 
annually during the 1990s (compared to 910,000 annual immigrants during the same time period) 
(see Table 2) and increasing steadily through the first decade of the 21st Century. The Population 
Reference Bureau estimates almost 330,000 emigrants in 2009.41  
                                                             
(...continued) 
live and work permanently in the United States. It includes (1) relatives of U.S. residents; (2) foreigners who were 
admitted for economic or employment reasons; (3) refugees and asylees; and (4) persons in the “diversity” category, 
which was created to introduce more variety into the stream of immigrants. It does not include nonimmigrants (visitors, 
short-term workers, or students) or illegal immigrants. 
37
 The period 1915-1965 has been referred to as one of “immigrant pause.” See P. Martin and E. Midgley, Immigration: 
Shaping and Reshaping America, Population Bulletin, vol. 58, no. 2, June 2003. 
38
 U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2009, data tables available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.  
39
 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
2000, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2002. 
40
 For example, the Congressional Budget Office attempted to estimate emigration using Social Security 
Administration data These estimates are not comparable with estimates from the Census Bureau because they were not 
tracking U.S. citizens who emigrated but only foreign nationals who emigrated. See Schwabish, JA. Identifying Rates 
of Emigration in the United States Using Administrative Earnings Records. March 2009 (at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/100xx/doc10029/2009-01.pdf). 
41
 Phillip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, Population Bulletin Update: Immigration in American 2010, Population 
Reference Bureau, Washington, DC, June 2010, http://www.prb.org/pdf10/immigration-update2010.pdf. 
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Table 2. U.S. Immigration and Estimated Emigration, by Decade: 1931-2009 
Period 
Immigrants to  
the United States 
(thousands, rounded ) 
Emigrants from  
the United States 
(thousands, rounded) 
Estimated Net  
immigration 
(thousands, 
rounded) 
Estimated Ratio: 
emigration/ 
immigration 
2001-2009 9,458 2,802 6,656 0.30 
1991-2000 9,081 2,338 6,743 0.26 
1981-1990 7,255 1,600 5,655 0.22 
1971-1980 4,399 1,176 3,223 0.27 
1961-1970 3,322 900 2,422 0.27 
1951-1960 2,515 425 2,090 0.17 
1941-1950 1,035 281 754 0.27 
1931-1940 528 649 -121 1.23 
Sources: For immigration, all years: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 
2009 data tables available online at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm. For emigration, 
years 1931-1990: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 2000, GPO, Washington, DC, 2002. For 1991-2000: U.S. Census Bureau, Net International 
Migration and its Sub-Components for the Vintage 2000 Post-censal National Estimates: 1990 to 2000, Internet release 
date February 8, 2002. For 2001-2005, Population Reference Bureau, Estimates and Projections of Emigration 
from the United States, available at http://www.prb.org/Journalists/FAQ/USEmigration.aspx. For 2005-2009, 
Phillip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, Population Bulletin Update: Immigration in American 2010, Population Reference 
Bureau, Washington, DC, June 2010, http://www.prb.org/pdf10/immigration-update2010.pdf. 
Characteristics of Net Immigration 
Highlights of American immigration in FY2009 include the following:42 
• Current U.S. policy on permanent immigration is based on four principles: the 
reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with special skills, the 
protection of refugees, and the diversity of admissions by country of origin.43 
• The number of persons granted lawful permanent residence in the United States 
was relatively stable between 2008 and 2009 increasing from 1.11 million to 1.13 
million.  
• The leading regions of origin of legal immigrants were North America and Asia. 
These regions accounted for 36% and 33%, respectively, of all legal immigrants 
in 2009. 
• The leading source countries (of birth) for legal immigrants in 2009 were Mexico 
(164,067 persons or 14.6%), followed by China (6.0%), the Philippines (5.3%), 
India (5.1%), Dominican Republic (4.4%), Cuba (3.4%), and Vietnam (2.6%). 
• The primary destination states in 2009, as in every year since 1971, were 
California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey.44 Sixty-two 
                                                             
42
 U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2009, data tables available online at 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.  
43
 CRS Report RL32235, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
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percent of all (legal) persons immigrating to the United States in 2009 lived in 
these six states. 
• In 2009, ten metropolitan areas were the intended residence of 57% of all legal 
immigrants. The leading destinations were New York-Northern New Jersey-Long 
Island, NY-NJ-PA; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA; Miami-Fort 
Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-
MD-WV; Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI; and the San Francisco-Oakland-
Fremont, CA metro area. 
• Unauthorized foreigners, also referred to as illegal aliens, deportable aliens, or 
undocumented workers, are persons in the United States in violation of U.S. 
immigration laws. Researchers at the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that there 
are more than 11.1 million unauthorized foreigners currently living in the United 
States which is approximately 4% of the population. The resident unauthorized 
foreigner population decreased between March of 2007 and March of 2009, the 
first reversal in growth in two decades.45 These researchers also found that this 
decline is driven by fewer unauthorized immigrants coming from Latin 
Americans countries other than Mexico, whereas the number of illegal aliens 
peaked in 2007 (at 7 million) and has since leveled off.46  
The Changing Age Profile—The United States Is Getting Older 
Aside from its total size, one of the most important demographic characteristics of a population 
for public policy is its age and sex structure. In general, a “young” population structure is seen in 
countries experiencing high fertility and rapid population growth, and the relevant policy 
considerations are whether there are sufficient schools and, later, enough jobs and housing to 
accommodate them. On the other hand, critical policy challenges in countries with “old” 
population structures are to develop retirement and health systems to serve the older population, 
often with simultaneous reductions in the number of working-age persons to support them. 
The population of the United States had been relatively “young” in the first half of the 20th 
century, a consequence of a history of three demographic trends acting in concert—relatively high 
fertility, declining infant and childhood mortality, and high rates of net immigration to the United 
States by young workers and families. Since 1950, the United States has been in the midst of a 
profound demographic change: rapid population aging,47 a phenomenon that is replacing the 
earlier “young” age-sex structure with that of an older population. As seen in Table 3, the 
population aged 65 and older has been increasing as a percentage of the total U.S. population. 
The older population represented 8.1% of the total population in year 1950. That percentage 
increased to 12.8% in 2009 (not in table), and is projected to reach 20.2% in 2050. Stated another 
way, one in five persons in 2050 will be aged 65 or older. 
                                                             
(...continued) 
44
 There has been some fluctuation in the order within those six states.  
45
 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, Pew 
Hispanic Center, September 1, 2010, at http://www.pewhispanic.org. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Aging (of a population) is a process in which the proportions of adults and elderly increase, while the proportions of 
younger persons decrease, resulting in a rise in the median age of the population. 
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Table 3. U.S. Population, by Age Group: 1950-2050 
Age/year 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 
Number (in thousands, rounded) 
Total 152,272 215,972 282,171 357,452 439,010 
0-19 51,673 75,646 80,576 94,254 112,940 
20-64 88,202 117,630 166,522 199,290 237,523 
65-65+ 12,397 22,696 35,074 63,907 88,547 
Percent in Age Group (rounded) 
0-19 33.9 35.0 28.6 26.4 25.7 
20-64 57.9 54.5 59.0 55.8 54.1 
65-65+ 8.1 10.5 12.4 17.9 20.2 
Source: CRS computations based on data in the U.S. January 21, 2011 based on the Census Bureau’s December 
2010 data release. These data do not include results from the 2010 census.  
Figure 4 graphically displays three population pyramids48 of the United States population at three 
points in time—in census years 1950 and, 2000, and projected to year 2050. The figure shows the 
proportion of persons in each five-year age and sex group in these three selected years. Note the 
increasing numbers on the x-axis, which highlights the increasing size of the U.S. population over 
time. 
                                                             
48
 A population pyramid is a bar chart, arranged vertically, that shows the distribution of a population by age and sex. 
By convention, the younger ages are at the bottom, with males on the left and females on the right. 
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Figure 4. Age-Sex Structure of the United States in Years 1950, 2000, and 2050 
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Source: CRS extractions from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), http://www.census.gov/ipc/
www/idb/country.php. 
Notes: U.S. data are based on official estimates and projections. Population estimates for 1950-1999 are based 
on the resident population plus the armed forces overseas. Population estimates for 2000-2008 are for the 
resident population and are based on Census 2000. The estimates are produced using vital statistics through 
2007 and survey data on international migration (supplemented with administrative data) through 2007. 
Population data in the IDB for 2009-2050 are projections of the resident population. The projections originate 
with a base population from Census 2000 and are produced using a cohort-component method—the most 
common method used for age structure projections because they take into account potential differences in the 
rates of mortality, fertility and migration at different ages . Projections are based on historical trends in vital 
statistics data through 2003 and administrative data on legal immigration through 2002. Census 2010 has been 
completed and preliminary data were released in December 2010; however, population projections have not yet 
been updated with these data. (See http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php). 
In 1950, the U.S. population, which numbered 152 million persons, was relatively young and its 
population pyramid generally resembled a Christmas tree. The widest portion, representing the 
most populous age group, was at the base—where 16.4 million new births and children under age 
5 accounted for 10.8% of the total population. Bars representing persons at older ages gradually 
narrow as deaths occur. The median age was 30.2 years49 and births outnumbered deaths by a 
margin of 2.5 to 1.0.50 Three characteristics of the 1950 pyramid are especially worth noting: 
• The only significant departure from a pyramidal shape is notches representing 
persons aged 10-24 years. Unusual bulges or bites in population pyramids are 
                                                             
49
 Extraction from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. 
50
 D.G. Fowles, Pyramid Power—Analysis of Demographic Revolution, Aging, winter, 1991. 
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usually caused by short-term fluctuations in birth and death rates that can be 
traced to such historical events as wars, epidemics, economic booms, or 
depressions. In this case of persons aged 10-24 years in this population pyramid, 
these persons were born primarily during the economic depression of the 1930’s 
when birth rates were comparatively low. 
• Early “baby boom” births are evident in the youngest age group.51 
• The number of persons aged 65 and older in the population was still relatively 
low—12.4 million persons, representing 8.1% of the U.S. population.  
The population pyramid in year 2000, the most recent year in which the U.S. population was 
enumerated by the decennial census,52 is typical of a population experiencing slow growth. 
Reflecting lower fertility, fewer people entered the lowest bars of the pyramid, and as life 
expectancy has increased, a greater percentage of persons have survived until old age. As a result, 
the population has been aging. By 2000, the median age of the population had risen to 35.3 years 
while infants and children under the age of five numbered 19.2 million, accounting for only 6.8% 
of the population. Important characteristics of the U.S. population in year 2000 included: 
• The U.S. population grew by roughly 85% between 1950 and 2000—from 152 
million to 282 million persons. The pyramid, which is significantly larger in all 
age groups, reflects this fact (see x-axis scaling in Figure 4). 
• The bulge of the baby-boom generation, those born between 1946-1964, can be 
seen in the pyramid for ages 35-54 years in 2000. After 1964, birth rates moved 
downward until the late 1970s. As the last members of the baby boom 
approached their childbearing years during the 1980s, the number of births rose 
again, peaking in 1990. These children, the youngest generation, are represented 
by the slightly widening base of the pyramid. Even though the number of births 
per woman had been near an all time low, the population continued to grow in 
part because of the children and grandchildren of the huge baby-boom 
generation.53 
• The number of persons aged 65 and older had been steadily increasing and 
reached 35.1 million persons, representing 12.4% of the U.S. population. 
• The fact that female survival chances exceed those of men, especially at the older 
ages, becomes noticeably more evident in the 2000 pyramid. About 4.3% of the 
total female population was aged 80 and above in 2000 compared to only 2.2% 
of men. 
By year 2050, projections of the U.S. population suggest that the population “pyramid” will no 
longer resemble a Christmas tree; rather, it will be increasingly rectangular. 
                                                             
51
 In the post-war years, Americans were marrying and starting families at younger ages and in greater percentages than 
they had during the Great Depression. The surge in births in the 19-year period between 1946 and 1964 resulted from a 
decline in childlessness combined with larger family sizes (more women had three or more children). See C.L. Himes, 
Elderly Americans, Population Bulletin, Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, December 2001 (hereinafter 
cited as C. Himes, Elderly Americans). 
52
 Census 2010 has been completed and preliminary data were released in December 2010; however, population 
projections have not yet been updated with these data. (See http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php).  
53
 Population Reference Bureau, Human Population: Fundamentals of Growth: Three Patterns of Population Change, at 
http://www.prb.org. 
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• In this population of 439.0 million persons, the most striking feature is the 
projected number of people who will be aged 65 and older—88.5 million, just 
over one in every five persons in the total U.S. population. To put these figures 
into perspective, the “oldest” state in 2009 was Florida with 17.2% of the state’s 
population in the age category 65 years and older.54 
• By year 2050, the percent elderly in the national population will surpass the 
figures observed in the “oldest” states today. The oldest-old, those aged 80 and 
above and including the youngest of the baby boomers, will be the most populous 
age group—32.5 million persons or 7.4% of the entire U.S. population. The 
oldest-old women of the same age will account for 8.5% of all women. 
• The “baby boom” generation will have accelerated population aging, but aging 
will continue to be one of the most important defining characteristics of the 
population, even after the youngest of the “baby boom” population has passed 
away. This reflects projections of continuing low fertility coupled with improving 
survival in the United States.55 
Race and Ethnicity—The United States Is Becoming More Diverse 
The U.S. population is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. This reflects two forces. 
First, immigration has been a major influence on both the size and the age structure of the U.S. 
population. Although most immigrants tend to be in their young adult ages, when people are most 
likely and willing to assume the risks of moving to a new country, U.S. immigration policy has 
also favored the entry of parents and other family members of these young immigrants.56 Second, 
major racial and ethnic groups are aging at different rates, depending upon fertility, mortality, and 
immigration within these groups. 
Federal standards for collecting and presenting data on race and Hispanic origin were established 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1997.57 Race and Hispanic origin are 
considered to be two separate and distinct concepts and are considered separately in this report. 
Race 
The OMB standards require federal agencies to use a minimum of five race categories in their 
data collection and presentation efforts. The new standards were required to be used by the 
Census Bureau for the 2000 decennial census and by other federal programs “as soon as possible, 
but not later than January 1, 2003.”58 
                                                             
54
 The “youngest” state was Alaska with 7.6% of the population over the age of 65. See U.S. Census Bureau, 
Geographic Comparison Table, Percent of the Total Population Who are 65 Years and Over (geographic ranked by 
estimate), 2009 Population Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov. 
55
 See CRS Report RL32981, Age Dependency Ratios and Social Security Solvency, by Laura B. Shrestha.  
56
 C.L. Himes, Elderly Americans. See also CRS Report RL32235, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, 
by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
57
 OMB, “Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,” Federal Register 
Notice, October 30, 1997, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/1997standards.html. These revised guidelines 
replace and supersede Statistical Policy Directive, no. 15. 
58
 OMB, ibid. 
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• White refers to people having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the 
Middle East, or North Africa. 
• Black or African American refers to people having origins in any of the Black 
racial groups of Africa. 
• American Indian and Alaska Native refers to people having origins in any of the 
original peoples of North and South America (including Central America), and 
who maintain tribal affiliation or community attachment. 
• Asian refers to people having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far 
East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent. 
• Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander refers to people having origins in 
the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands. 
For respondents unable to identify with any of these five race categories, the OMB approved 
including a sixth category—“some other race.” 
Going beyond the minimum standards set by OMB, the American Community Survey59 question 
on race included 15 separate response categories and three areas where respondents could write in 
a more specific group.60 Individuals were instructed to mark “one or more races to indicate what 
this person considers himself/herself to be.”61 The response categories and write-in answers were 
combined by the Census Bureau to create the five minimum OMB race categories, as seen in 
Table 4. Based on data from the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the overwhelming 
majority of the U.S. population—almost 98%—reported only one race. The most prevalent group, 
accounting for about 74%62 of the U.S. population, was those who reported that they are white 
alone, followed by those who are Black or African American alone (12%). The smallest race 
group was the Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander alone population, with 448,000 
members, representing less than 0.2% of the U.S. population. 
                                                             
59
 The American Community Survey (ACS) is the Census Bureau’s ongoing population estimates program that 
produces annual population, demographic, and housing unit estimates. For more information, see CRS Report R41532, 
The American Community Survey: Development, Implementation, and Issues for Congress, by Jennifer D. Williams. 
60
 Q: what is this person’s race? (1) White; (2) Black or African Am., or Negro; (3) American Indian or Alaska 
Native—print name of enrolled or principal tribe; (4) Asian Indian; (5) Chinese; (6) Filipino; (7) Japanese; (8) Korean; 
(9) Vietnamese; (10) Other Asian—print race; (11) Native Hawaiian; (12) Guamanian or Chamorro; (13) Samoan; (14) 
Other Pacific Islander—print race; and (15) Some other race—print race. 
61
 Identification of both race and Hispanic origin are based on self-identification in the U.S. census and the American 
Community Survey. 
62
 Note that the percentage of the population that reported being White alone declined from Census 2000 to 2009 from 
81% to 74%. 
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Table 4. U.S. Population, by Race: 2009 
Race 
Number  
(in thousands) 
Percentage of  
total population 
Total Population  301,461 100.00 
One race  294,793 97.78 
 White 224,470 74.46 
 Black or African American 37,265 12.36 
 Asian 13,201 4.38 
 American Indian and Alaska Native 2,423 0.80 
 Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander 448 0.15 
 Some other race  16,986 5.63 
Two or more   6,669 2.21 
Sources: CRS compilation based on: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-year 
Estimates.  
Referring to Table 5, while about 81% of the population was white in 2000, that figure is 
projected to fall to 74% by year 2050.63 Increases will be most dramatic for Asians and for 
persons in the “other races” category (which includes American Indians and Alaska Natives, 
Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, and individuals who identify with two or more 
races). Between 2000 and 2050, the number of Asians is expected to increase by 23.7 million 
persons, an increase of 220%, while the number in the “all other races” (which includes persons 
who identify with two or more races) category will increase by almost 15.8 million, or 223%. 
                                                             
63
 Comparisons with earlier censuses are not provided as the Census Bureau cautions that “the Census 2000 data on 
race are not directly comparable with data from the 1990 census or earlier censuses. Caution must be used when 
interpreting changes in the racial composition of the U.S. population over time.” E.M. Crieco and R.C. Cassidy, 
Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin, U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2000 Brief, C2KBR/01-1, issued March 2001. 
Table 4 presents the U.S. population by race in 2009. The table shows that the 2009 population was more diverse than 
had been projected using Census 2000 data.  
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Table 5. Projected U.S. Population, by Race: 2000-2050 
(numbers in thousands) 
Population 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Total 
282,125  
(100.0) 
310,233 
(100.0) 
341,387 
(100.0) 
373,504 
(100.0) 
405,655  
(100.0) 
439,010 
(100.0) 
White alone 
228,548  
(81.0) 
246,630 
(79.5) 
266,275 
(78.0) 
286,109 
(76.6) 
305,247  
(75.2) 
324,800 
(74.0) 
Black alone 
35,818  
(12.7) 
39,909 
(12.9) 
44,389 
(13.0) 
48,728 
(13.0) 
52,868  
(13.0) 
56,944 
(13.0) 
Asian alone 
10,684  
(3.8) 
14,415 
(4.6) 
18,756 
(5.5) 
23,586 
(6.3) 
28,836  
(7.1) 
34,399 
(7.8) 
All other racesa 
7,075  
(2.5) 
9,279 
(3.0) 
11,967 
(3.5) 
15,081 
(4.0) 
18,704  
(4.6) 
22,867 
(5.2) 
Source: For years 2010-2050: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. “Table 4. Projections of the Population 
by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: 2010 to 2050.” (NP2008-T4). Release date: August 14, 
2008. For year 2000: U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin,” 
Internet release data: March 18, 2004, at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/. 
Notes: In thousands, except as indicated. As of July 1. Resident population. Numbers may not add due to 
rounding. 
a. “All other races” includes American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander alone, and persons of Two or More Races. 
Hispanic Origin 
OMB defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central 
American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.” Federal agencies are required to 
use a minimum of two ethnicities: “Hispanic or Latino” and “Not Hispanic or Latino” in data 
collection and presentation. The new standard was used by the Census Bureau in the 2000 
decennial census; other federal programs were expected to adopt the standards no later than 
January 1, 2003. 
Beginning with census 2000, respondents of all races were asked if they were Spanish, Hispanic, 
or Latino, and were given the opportunity to differentiate between: (1) Mexican, Mexican 
American, Chicano; (2) Puerto Rican; (3) Cuban; and (4) other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.64 Based 
on this definition, in 2009, almost 45 million persons, or about 15.1% of the U.S. population, 
identified themselves as Hispanic. The remaining 256 million people, or 84.9%, were not 
Hispanic.65 
As mentioned earlier, OMB and the U.S. Census Bureau consider race and Hispanic origin to be 
distinct concepts. The results from census 2000, however, suggest that such a distinction is not 
made by persons of Hispanic origin themselves. The most commonly reported race for Hispanics 
was white alone—almost 17 million persons or almost 48% of the Hispanic population. But, a 
staggering 14.9 million Hispanics—or 42.2%—reported that they belonged to “some other race,” 
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 E.M. Crieco and R.C. Cassidy, ibid. 
65
 U.S. Census Bureau,” Hispanic or Latino by Specific Origin, 2005-2009 American Community Survey,” at 
http://factfinder.census.gov. 
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indicating that they did not identify with any of the 14 other categories offered on the census 
questionnaire.66 
Table 6 presents modified estimates of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations of the United 
States. The modification reconciles the census 2000 race categories with those race categories 
that appear in the data from administrative records, which are used to produce population 
estimates and projections.67 These are also consistent with the recommended set of five categories 
by OMB. 
Table 6. The Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Population 
in the United States, by Race: 2000 
Hispanic or Latino Not Hispanic or Latino 
Race 
Number  
(in 000s) 
Percent  
of  
Hispanics 
Percent 
of  
Total 
Number 
(in 000s) 
Percent  
of non- 
Hispanics 
Percent 
of  
Total 
Total 35,306 100.00 12.55 246,116 100.00 87.45 
One race  34,814 98.61 12.37 242,710 98.62 86.24 
 White 32,529 92.13 11.56 195,576 79.46 69.50 
 Black 1,391 3.94 0.49 34,313 13.94 12.19 
 Asian 232 0.66 0.08 10,357 4.21 3.68 
 American Indian 566 1.60 0.20 2,097 0.85 0.75 
 Hawaiian 95 0.27 0.03 367 0.15 0.13 
Two races 434 1.23 0.15 3,144 1.28 1.12 
Three or more races 57 0.16 0.02 262 0.11 0.09 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Modified Race Data Summary File. More recent data, including Census 2010 data, 
examining race and ethnicity simultaneously are not available.  
With the release of the results of the 2000 census, the growing role of Hispanics in the United 
States became apparent.68 Numbering over 35 million at that time—and growing by more than 
1.5 annually from both immigration and natural increase—Hispanics are now the nation’s largest 
minority.69 If current demographic trends continue, the population of Hispanic or Latino origin is 
projected to steadily increase as a percentage of the total U.S. population through 2050, rising 
from 12.6% in 2000 (or about one in seven persons) to 30.2% in 2050 (approaching one in every 
three persons) (see Figure 5). 
                                                             
66
 U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin,” at http://www.census.gov/
ipc/www/usinterimproj/, internet release date: March 18, 2004. For comparison, only 0.2% of non-Hispanics chose the 
“some other race” category. 
67
 U.S. Census Bureau, “Modified Race Data Summary File. 
68
 National Research Council (2006). Multiple Origins, Uncertain Destinies: Hispanics and the American Future. Panel 
on Hispanics in the United States. M. Tienda and F. Mitchell, eds. Committee on Population, Division of Behavioral 
and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
69
 Ibid. 
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Figure 5. Hispanics and Non-Hispanics as Percentage of U.S. Population: 2000-2050 
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Source: For years 2010-2050: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. Table 6. Percent of the Projected 
Population by Race and Hispanic Origin for the United States: 2010 to 2050. (NP2008-T6). Release Date: August 
14, 2008. For year 2000: CRS extractions from: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, 
Race, and Hispanic Origin, at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/, internet release date: March 18, 
2004 the U.S. Census Bureau. 
The National Research Council (2006) characterizes the Hispanic population in the U.S. as 
having “a youthful age structure; a large number of foreign born, including many 
‘undocumented’; [with] low levels of education; and a disproportionate concentration in low-
skill, low-wage jobs. Of particular policy interest is the Hispanic second generation, the children 
of Spanish-speaking immigrants, who are coming of age as the white majority population is 
aging.” 
Some Policy Considerations 
The changing demographic profile will impact upon a wide range of social and economic issues 
in the United States. The following section presents a short discussion of some major policy 
considerations that are related to these changes. Neither the list nor the discussions are 
comprehensive. 
Work, Retirement, and Pensions 
The increasing financial pressure faced by public pension systems, such as Social Security, is 
often attributed to demographic trends that have led to aging populations. However, beyond the 
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simple mathematics of the worsening age dependency ratio,70 decreasing labor force participation 
rates have contributed to financial imbalances within pension programs, further increasing the 
number of retired persons relative to those in the workforce. 
The declining labor force participation of older men is one of the most dramatic economic trends 
of the past four decades in the United States. Between 1963 and 2008, labor force participation 
rates declined from 90% to 76% among men aged 55-61. Over this period, labor force 
participation rates dropped from 76% to 53% for men aged 62-64 and from 21% to 15% for men 
aged 70 and over.71 For all of these groups, most of the declines occurred prior to the early 1980s.  
An individual’s decision of whether to stay in the workforce or to retire is based on the complex 
interaction of a number of factors including, but not limited to the following: 
• Eligibility for Social Security benefits. 
• Availability of and benefits under an employer-financed pension plan. 
• Work incentives to stay in the labor force (such as continued benefit accrual after 
attaining the early retirement age, options for phased retirement or to work 
reduced hours, etc.). 
• The physical and cognitive health of the worker and potentially other family 
members (spouse, an aging parent, an adult child with a disability). 
• Availability (and eligibility for) disability and unemployment insurance 
programs. 
• The worker’s relative preference for “leisure” compared to employment.72 
Policy levers are, however, available to influence labor force participation and retirement 
decision-making. For instance, the federal government influences employers’ decisions about 
whether to offer benefits like pensions and health insurance through direct legislation, such as 
ERISA and the Age Discrimination Act; through social insurance programs, such as Social 
Security and Medicare; and through the financial incentives created for both employers and 
employees by the Internal Revenue Code.73 
Private Wealth and Income Security74 
Income security during retirement, coupled with an increase in the number of post-retirement 
years during which individuals can enjoy family and leisure, is one of the primary social 
                                                             
70
 The ratio of the number of “dependent” persons in a population (children and older persons) to the number of persons 
of “working age.” See CRS Report RL32981, Age Dependency Ratios and Social Security Solvency, by Laura B. 
Shrestha, Age Dependency Ratios and Social Security Solvency, by Laura B. Shrestha. 
71
 Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-related Statistics, 2010, Older Americans 2010: Key Indicators of Well-Being. 
Indicator #11, based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey. Available at 
http://www.agingstats.gov. 
72
 For more information on retirement decision-making, see National Institute on Aging, National Institutes of Health , 
Growing Older in America: The Health and Retirement Study, Bethesda, MD, March 2007, http://www.nia.nih.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/D164FE6C-C6E0-4E78-B27F-7E8D8C0FFEE5/0/HRS_Text_WEB.pdf. 
73
 CRS Report R41557, Older Unemployed Workers Following the Recent Economic Recession, by Janemarie Mulvey. 
74
 National Research Council, Preparing for an Aging World, 2001. 
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achievements of the 20th century. At the same time, this accomplishment has introduced some 
fundamental public policy challenges associated with population aging. From an individual’s 
perspective, the two most basic challenges are to ensure that they have sufficient income security 
during their retirement years and that they have protection against the increasing risk of 
experiencing periods of poor health and/or disability. 
For policy-makers, there are fundamental questions with respect to what the federal role should 
be in helping individuals meet these objectives. A major domestic political challenge of the 21st 
century will be how to adapt our old-age income security and health insurance systems to ensure 
financial solvency while ensuring that there is an adequate safety net to protect the most 
vulnerable in the population. One option that is likely to be considered involves relying on 
individual private savings and wealth accumulation to offset any reductions that may take place in 
the level of public-tier support. The underlying question is how realistic it is to assume that 
individuals will save sufficiently over their lifetimes to contribute significantly to their own 
income needs during retirement. Another central question regarding income security for older 
persons is whether individuals and families will assume greater responsibility for their own 
retirements if current government programs are scaled back because of budgetary pressures. 
The Federal Budget and Inter-generational Equity 
Several decades of population aging have occurred in the United States wherein the proportion of 
young persons has declined while the number of older persons has expanded dramatically. The 
changing age structure has raised philosophical questions around the theme of inter-generational 
equity. Many analysts might expect such demographic changes to have favorable consequences 
for children and troubling ones for older persons. Fewer children should mean less competition 
for resources in the home as well as greater availability of social services earmarked for children, 
especially public schooling. The sharp rise in the number of elderly should put enormous pressure 
on resources directed towards the older ages, such as medical care facilities, nursing homes, and 
social security funds.75 However, Preston, in his 1984 presidential address to the membership of 
the Population Association of America documented that exactly the opposite had occurred: 
conditions for children had, in fact, deteriorated while they had improved dramatically for older 
Americans. 
Now, over two decades later, the issue continues to be one of considerable debate. Analysts76 have 
argued that, without an overhaul of entitlement programs (which largely favor older persons) or 
tax-revenue reform, the ever-expanding Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid budgets will 
tighten the squeeze on other domestic spending (including programs for children, welfare, 
education, the environment, community development, housing, energy, and justice—programs 
that reach the majority of all Americans.) But, others argue that there are potentially catastrophic 
outcomes associated with the redistribution of federal resources among age categories. For 
instance, the safety nets for the most vulnerable may be interrupted. Costs might be transferred to 
the states, with limited capacity to absorb the additional expenditures. Individuals may be unable 
to assume the additional responsibilities asked of them. 
                                                             
75
 S. H. Preston, Children and the Elderly: Divergent Paths for America’s Dependents. Demography, vol. 21, no. 4, 
1984 (hereinafter cited as Preston, Children and the Elderly, 1984). 
76
 A. Carasso, C.E. Steuerle, G. Reynolds, T. Vericker, and J. Ehrle-Macomber, Kids’ Share 2008: How Children Fare 
in the Federal Budget. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2008; C. E. Steuerle, The Incredible Shrinking Budget for 
Working Families and Children, Washington, DC: The Urban Institute: National Budget Issues, no. 1, December 2003. 
The Changing Demographic Profile of the United States 
 
Congressional Research Service 26 
There is no generally accepted rule in welfare economics for how an age group’s interests ought 
to be represented in public decision-making. As noted by Preston,77 however, we are continually 
faced with two questions. First, do we care about our collective future—the commonwealth—or 
only about our individual futures? And, if we have collective concerns, we face an even more 
difficult decision about what mix of private and public responsibilities will best serve the needs of 
the generations. 
Health, Healthcare, and Health Spending  
Health policy is interrelated with population change. Changes in the population size, racial and 
ethnic composition, and age structure affect the healthcare resources needed, spending levels, and 
health conditions observed. For example, recent fertility changes with more births occurring to 
women at the beginning and end of childbearing years—to teenagers and women over 40 
respectively—could have profound consequences on the health of the children born to these 
mothers. Specifically, there have been large increases in the birth rate of women over the age of 
40. Children born to mothers at later ages are at greater risk for a number of health conditions 
including Downs Syndrome. Infants born to women at later ages are also more likely to be low 
birth weight which is associated with higher infant mortality rates, premature birth, and a number 
of other health problems.78 Increasing numbers of women delaying childbearing past age 40 may 
increase the number of children born with health conditions which may, among other things, 
increase health spending and increase the need for specific health resources such as neonatal 
intensive care. At the other end of the age spectrum, babies born to teenage mother are also at 
increased risk for a number of health conditions. Babies born to teenage mothers are more likely 
to be premature and low birth weight. Additionally, teenage mother receive less prenatal care than 
women giving birth at later ages which may exacerbate or cause adverse outcomes.79 
Changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the population will also have profound effects on 
the health and healthcare needs of the population. There are observed differences in how different 
groups use health services with non-Hispanic whites more likely to visit physicians in an office-
setting while non-Hispanic blacks more frequently seek care in emergency rooms. There are also 
differences in the types of care sought and utilized by race and ethnicity,80 differences in health 
conditions experienced, and differences in both mortality rates and mortality rates for specific 
conditions.81 These differences, which are in part related to socioeconomic differences across 
racial and ethnic groups could mean that there will be a growing proportion of the population in 
poorer health, with higher incidence of certain health conditions, less access to health insurance 
and health services, and higher mortality rates at certain ages. Current racial and ethnic 
differentials coupled with future population growth create challenges for healthcare planning in 
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terms of the services needed and the workforce required to best serve an increasingly diverse 
population.  
The Health and Healthcare Needs of an Aging Population 
Beyond the increasing diversity of the population, the aging of the population can have profound 
impacts on the health and health services needed. Although population aging may or may not 
result in increasing proportions of older persons in poor health, the numbers experiencing that 
condition are almost certain to rise. Thus, as the U.S. population ages, the social and economic 
demands on individuals, families, communities, and the government will grow, with a substantial 
impact on the formal and informal health and social care systems and on the financing of medical 
services in general. A report issued by the Institute of Medicine in 2008 found that the U.S. 
healthcare workforce will be too small and not appropriately organized or trained to meet the 
health needs of a growing aging population. They cited both a lack of physicians and other 
providers who specialize in providing care for older adults and a lack of competence in providing 
care for older adults throughout the health workforce.82  
In conjunction with, and driven by, the growing numbers of older persons, the United States faces 
secular change in health status, as reflected in rates and outcomes of various conditions and 
disabilities. Trends in cognitive impairment and dementia have enormous policy implications, but 
whether changes in disease and disability rates will alter the rates of long-term care in institutions 
or in other settings is unclear. The use of long-term care, because of cognitive impairment or 
other health conditions, is expected to increase as Americans live longer.83 The future need for 
long-term care has financial implications for states, and for the federal government as the 
majority—nearly three quarters—of long-term care expenses are funded by public programs most 
commonly Medicaid.84  
While recognizing the necessity to address the changing health needs of the older population, 
critical questions remain regarding the best mechanisms for health system organization, delivery 
of and access to services, administration, and financing. The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (P.L. 111-148), recently enacted health reform legislation, may address some of these 
concerns, but critics contend that the law may exacerbate provider shortages85 and do little to 
control growing healthcare costs or reduce inefficiency.86 
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Immigration Policy 
Immigration has historically been a major contributor to population growth in the United States. 
The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is higher than at any point in 
U.S. history and at 12.5% (in 2008) has reached a proportion of the U.S. population not seen 
since the early 20th century.87 Of the 38 million foreign-born residents, approximately one-third 
are naturalized citizens, one-third are legal permanent residents, and one-third are estimated to be 
unauthorized (illegal) residents.” The growing number of illegal immigrants has given rise to a 
consensus that the immigration system is seriously flawed. Despite this consensus, there are 
major disagreements over proposed solutions.88 U.S. policy on permanent immigration has been 
based on four principles: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with special 
skills, the protection of refugees, and the diversity of admissions by country of origin,89 the 
balance of these four principles and whether the balance changes has implications for the size and 
composition of the U.S. population. For example, those who immigrate under family reunification 
policies tend to be older; while those entering for employment reasons are generally younger. The 
number of immigrants seeking to enter the U.S. and the needs of businesses seeking workers are 
linked to economic conditions and trends. The current recession has lowered immigration levels, 
but companies still want an immigration policy that allows the entry of both highly skilled 
workers and low-skilled temporary workers.90 Other argue that immigration policies could 
adversely affect the economic well-being of the U.S population by creating competition for jobs 
in a context of high unemployment.  
Immigration issues and potential reform have broad implications for a number of policy areas. 
Immigration may stimulate the economy by providing both low and high skilled workers.91 
Pursuing an immigration strategy that favors workers entering for employment reasons may also 
slow U.S. population aging thus averting or delaying a number of the policy challenges that could 
arise from population aging. Immigration may also create a number of policy challenges. For 
example, immigrants are often concentrated in certain geographic areas which may strain local 
governments and infrastructure. The number and type of immigrants seeking to enter the U.S. 
may also impact areas such as homeland security, the workforce, and crime and law enforcement 
policy. The country of origin of immigrants will also affect the racial and ethnic composition of 
the U.S. population and contributes to the increasing diversity in the U.S. which, as discussed 
below, has a number of policy implications.  
America’s Changing Color Lines 
The U.S. population is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. Once a mainly biracial 
society with a large white majority and relatively small black minority—and an impenetrable 
color line dividing these groups—the United States is now a society composed of multiple racial 
and ethnic groups. Along with increased immigration are rises in the rates of racial/ethnic 
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intermarriage, which in turn have led to a sizeable and growing multiracial population.92 These 
trends are projected to continue for the next decades. 
This diversity presents policy challenges in a number of areas. For instance: 
• Assimilation. Many Asian Americans speak their native languages at home and 
maintain their distinct ethnic cultures and values, signaling that they either face 
difficulties fully assimilating into the American mainstream or purposefully resist 
full assimilation. The continued flows of Latino immigrants ensure that the 
Spanish language and diverse Latino cultures will endure in the United States.93 
The degree to which there are language barriers or lack of assimilation of 
immigrants has important implications for both entry into and achievement in the 
educational system and the labor force. 
• Income Disparities. There are persistent differences in household incomes among 
racial/ethnic groups in the United States.94 For instance, in 2009, the real median 
income level for a black household—at about $33,000—was about $19,000 
lower than that of a non-Hispanic white household (about $52,000).95 One 
consequence of this disparity had been that low-income/low-wealth persons had 
faced hurdles when attempting to become homeowners.96 Key findings from a 
study from the Department of Housing and Urban Development showed that 
subprime loans are three times more likely in low income neighborhoods than in 
high-income ones, and that predatory lending practices made homeownership far 
more costly for poor families.97 
• Poverty. The official poverty rate in 2009 was 14.3 percent, up from 13.2 percent 
in 2008; the most recent figure is the highest poverty rate since 1994. 
Nonetheless, it was still 8.1 percentage points lower than in 1959, the first year 
for which poverty estimates are available.98 In 2009, 43.6 million people were 
counted as poor—the third consecutive increase in the number of people in 
poverty.99 According to Gabe,100 the most recent increase in poverty reflects the 
worsening economic conditions since the onset of the economic recession in 
December 2007 and is expected to remain comparatively high even after the 
economy begins to recover.  
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America’s racial minorities continue to have disproportionately high poverty 
rates. In 2009, African Americans and Hispanics had poverty rates that exceed 
those of whites by several times. In 2009, 25.8% of blacks (9.9 million) and 
25.3% of Hispanics (12.3 million) had incomes below poverty, compared to 9.4% 
of non-Hispanic whites (18.5 million) and 12.5% of Asians (1.8 million).101 
Poverty and welfare receipt are inextricably linked. Government programs may 
help low-income persons meet their basic daily needs (through cash assistance 
programs such as TANF,102 Medicaid,103or food stamps (now called the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP),104 though some observers 
fear that welfare creates economic dependency and perpetuates the cycle of 
poverty. 
                                                             
101
 Ibid.  
102
 CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF 
Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk. 
103
 CRS Report RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer, by Elicia J. Herz. 
104
 CRS Report R40397, Child Nutrition and WIC Programs: A Brief Overview, by Joe Richardson.  
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Appendix. U.S. Population Growth Rates, Birth 
Rates, Death Rates, and Net Immigration Rates: 
1950-2050 
(per 1,000 population) 
Year Growth Rate Birth Rate Death Rate 
Net  
Immigration  
Rate 
1950 16.5 24.1 9.6 2.0 
1960 16.0 23.7 9.5 1.8 
1970 11.0 18.4 9.5 2.1 
1980 10.8 15.9 8.8 3.7 
1990 10.3 16.7 8.6 2.2 
2000 9.3 14.4 8.5 4.1 
2010 9.7 13.8 8.3 4.3 
2020 9.4 13.4 8.4 4.3 
2030 8.6 13.0 8.9 4.5 
2040 8.0 13.0 9.6 4.6 
2050 7.9 12.9 9.7 4.7 
Sources: Estimates (Years 1950-2000): Birth Rates: For years 1950, 1960, 1970: Vital Statistics of the United 
States, 1999, vol. 1, Natality, Table 1-1, at website http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/stataib/unpubd/natality/
nata99.htm. For years 1980, 1990, 2000: NVSR: Births: Final Data for 2002, 52(10): Table 1. 
Death Rates: National Vital Statistics Report (NVSR): Deaths: Final Data for 2002, 53(5): Table 1. 
Net Immigration Rates: For year 1950: U.S. Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1980. Table 
4. For years 1960, 1970, and 1980: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990. Table 14, for year 1990, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, Table 4, at http://www.census.gov/statab/www/. Note that 
Statistical Abstracts for selected years (back to 1878) are available at this site. For year 2000: U.S. Census Bureau 
Population Estimates: Components of Population Change, at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-comp-
chg.html.  
Growth Rates: CRS computations based on data on birth, death, and net immigration rates above.  
Projections (Years 2010-2050): U.S. Census Bureau, Components of Change for the Total Resident Population, Middle 
Series 2010-2100, at http://www.census.gov/population/www.projections. 
Notes: Data on 1980 births are based on 100% of births in selected states and on a 50% sample in all other 
states.  
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